Towards a Model of Argument Strength for Bipolar Argumentation Graphs by Rast, Erich Herrmann
STUDIES IN LOGIC, GRAMMAR
AND RHETORIC 55 (68) 2018
DOI: 10.2478/slgr-2018-0027
Erich Rast
New University of Lisbon
ORCID 0000-0002-3067-1353
TOWARDS A MODEL OF ARGUMENT STRENGTH
FOR BIPOLAR ARGUMENTATION GRAPHS
Abstract. Bipolar argument graphs represent the structure of complex pro and
contra arguments for one or more standpoints. In this article, ampliative and
exclusionary principles of evaluating argument strength in bipolar acyclic argu-
mentation graphs are laid out and compared to each other. Argument chains,
linked arguments, link attackers and supporters, and convergent arguments are
discussed. The strength of conductive arguments is also addressed but it is ar-
gued that more work on this type of argument is needed to properly distinguish
argument strength from more general value-based components of such argu-
ments. The overall conclusion of the article is that there is no justifiably unique
solution to the problem of argument strength outside of a particular epistemo-
logical framework.
Keywords: argument structure, conductive argument, convergent argument, pos-
sibility theory, argument visualization.
1. Introduction
The goal of this article is to lay out minimal conditions for the way
in which the strength of arguments is combined into an overall strength of
a more complex argument on the basis of an initial intuitive assessment of
the strength of its subarguments. Although the principles in this article are
based on existing research, there is no agreement about how to deal with
argument strength in the seminal literature, because the ways in which
argument strength may be computed depend on the presumed theory of
argument structure. Authors have proposed different ways of structuring
arguments and slightly different taxonomies of types of argument struc-
ture. I, therefore, take a rather permissive and broad stance about argu-
ment structure in this article and attempt to determine intuitively appeal-
ing principles for the combination of argument strength for those argument
structure types that have been proposed. This does not indicate that I en-
dorse or recommend the given taxonomy, which will to some extent always
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remain arbitrary. The focus of this article is on finding general principles
for the combination of argument strength. If someone believes that a cer-
tain type of argument structure, such as ‘conductive argument’, does not
exist, no harm is done by ignoring the corresponding principles. The dis-
cussion of the principles is deliberately condensed for reasons of space, but
in order to properly situate the account within the literature on argument
strength a number of basic distinctions are needed. These are laid out in
the remainder of this introductory section.
In positional accounts of argument strength, arguments are evaluated
with respect to their place in a larger argumentation network in which they
occur, but often no degree of strength is assigned to individual premises
or conclusions. In Dung’s Abstract Argumentation Frameworks (AAFs)
(Dung 1995), for instance, argumentation is modelled on the basis of at-
tack relations between arguments, and arguments are either “in” or “out”
depending on whether they are successfully attacked by other arguments
or not. In his original framework Dung only defines an attack relation, and
support only exists in a derived way based on the notion of defending an
argument against an attack. An argument a supports another argument b
in this theory only if a attacks an argument c that attacks b. This way of
modelling support has been criticized by Cayrol & Lagasquie-Schiex (2005),
who argue that attacking an attacker is not the same as supporting an
argument directly, and therefore extended AAFs into bipolar argumenta-
tion frameworks (BAFs). These consist of a set of arguments, a relation
of support, and an attack relation between them (Cayrol & Lagasquie-
Schiex, 2009, 66–68). They also consider assigning initial values to argu-
ments in a BAF and ways to extend these to a full valuation of the network
on the basis of whether they are attacked with some strength or defeated.
These accounts utilize a notion of graded argument strength that is also the
topic of this article. However, their approach does not do justice to more
general work on argument structure, because they do not distinguish be-
tween linked arguments and convergent arguments and between convergent
and conductive arguments. The first distinction was introduced by Thomas
(1977) and is explicitly taken into account by Yanal (1991), Walton (1996),
Freeman (2011), and Selinger (2014) among others. The term ‘conductive
argument’ is in turn used by Wellman (1971), Govier (2013), Zenker (2011)
and others, although there is no general agreement on a definition and ter-
minology differs slightly from author to author.1
Unfortunately, even in bipolar graded approaches that deal with both
linked and convergent arguments, there is no agreement about the key prin-
ciples that a measure of argument strength must satisfy. On the one hand,
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there are probabilistic approaches such as Nielsen & Parsons (2006) and to
some extent Yanal (1991) that take the probabilities that the premises of an
inference are true as a basis for an evaluation of a larger chain of inference.
On the other hand, others such as Selinger (2014) are interested in the cred-
ibility or acceptability of arguments, where the rules governing acceptability
need not necessarily follow the probability calculus and rules for knowledge
transmission in Bayesian networks. One may call these acceptability-based.
Another important distinction is that between ampliative, nonamplia-
tive, and exclusionary theories of argument strength. These are based on
a distinction between the quantity of arguments versus their quality. Argu-
ment quantity is defined as the number of arguments in a complex argu-
mentation that can independently support a conclusion. In contrast to this,
the quality of an argument is given by its soundness, validity, and other
standards of correctness of the premises and the way in which these are sup-
posed to support the conclusion. In an ampliative or cumulative approach
like that of Cayrol & Lagasquie-Schiex (2009) and Selinger (2014), multi-
ple independent arguments for the same standpoint generally increase the
strength of the overall argumentation. In other words, quantity influences
quality in these accounts. In contrast to this, in a nonampliative account
the overall strength of the argumentation does not increase by adding addi-
tional, redundant inferences to the same conclusion. As a special case of the
nonampliative approach, in an exclusionary account there is no functional
relation between argument quantity and quality.
With respect to these distinctions, the account in this article is bipolar,
graded, and acceptability-based. Both exclusionary and ampliative princi-
ples will be discussed, and the account also gives justice to the distinction
between linked and convergent arguments. However, the goal of this article
is not to generally contrast this type of approach with the others mentioned
above, but rather to identify a small set of rationality principles from which
more specific theories of argument strength can be derived.
2. Bipolar Argumentation Graphs
2.1. Argument Structure
In this section I introduce bipolar argumentation graph (BAG) struc-
tures. Since none of the postulates and rules to be discussed hinges on
particular features of a particular representation of argument structure (nor
should they), it suffices to lay out a number of basic subgraphs out of which
larger graphs can be composed. These are annotated with one or more
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premises at nodes, a conclusion, inference links, the polarity of a link as⊕ for
pro and ⊖ for contra, and an initial assessment of argument strength, which
is attached to the premises in linked and conductive arguments and to the
link in the basic part of a convergent argument.
Here is the list of admissible subgraphs:
– Basic arguments: A basic argument consists of a pro or contra inference
link from a single premise to a conclusion. A basic argument is depicted
as an arrow from a premise to a conclusion, labelled with its polarity
and an initial assessment of its strength.
– Convergent arguments (Figure 1): These consist of several basic, linked,
or conductive arguments towards the same conclusion, where all links
must be either pro or contra. They are depicted by multiple arrows
that lead to a conclusion. The arrows are marked with possibly different
strengths, but the same polarity, for all basic arguments of a convergent
argument.
Figure 1. Structure of a convergent argument with initial strengths x1, . . . , xn and
polarity p. Each arrow constitutes a basic argument for standpoint b, but
the argument as a whole forms a cohesive unit
– Linked arguments (Figure 2): These link several premises together to
support or attack a conclusion. They are depicted by a horizontal line
from which an arrow leads to a conclusion, where the arrow is labelled
with a polarity. As I will lay out in more detail below, an initial assess-
ment of strength of a linked argument is based on individual strengths
of each premise with respect to the argument as a whole.
Figure 2. Structure of a linked argument with initial strengths x1, . . . , xn and
polarity p. Removing a link will result in a much less conclusive or an
inconclusive argument
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– Conductive arguments (Figure 3): These link several premises together
to support or attack a conclusion on the basis of trade-off considerations.
They are depicted like linked arguments but with a double arrow. As in
linked arguments, an initial assessment of their strength depends on the
individual strengths of their premises. In addition to linked arguments,
however, individual premises are marked with polarities. As a further
constraint, if a link has polarity p, then at least one premise must have
polarity p as well.
Figure 3. Structure of a conductive argument with initial strengths/values x1, . . . ,
xn, individual polarities p1, . . . , pn and overall polarity p. Additional
evaluations v1(a1), v2(a2), . . . , vn(an) will be needed
– Link attackers and link supporters (Figure 4): These support or attack
the individual inference links rather than premises. They are depicted
as arrows to the middle of an arrow and annotated with polarity and an
initial assessment of their strength like the other types of argument. The
original premises can be linked, conductive, or part of a basic argument,
and the attacking argument (C, in the figure) may be of any type,
including a convergent argument with several attack or support links.
Figure 4. An argument for or against the inference link of another argument
with strength x and polarity q; A and C can have a complex argument
structure and the inference from A to b can be of various structure types
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A conclusion can itself form a premise of any of the above argument
types. Since BAGs are also finite and acyclic (more on this below), they have
initial nodes and terminal nodes. If there is an inference link (arrow) from A
to B, then A is the antecedent of B and B the successor of A. Sometimes
also an argument as a whole will be called an antecedent if an arrow leads
away from its conclusion; whether an individual premise or an argument
as a whole is meant will be clear from the context. Initial nodes are those
nodes that contain premises without antecedents and terminal nodes are
those nodes that contain conclusions without successors.
We may speak of an argument chain to a conclusion b whenever there
are two or more arrows from premises A1, . . . , An that lead to b on a direct
path: A1 → A2 → . . . → An → B. The links and premises can form any
type of argument subgraph, and so capital letters are used to distinguish
them from individual premises. Chains of two arguments are distinguished
into pro-pro, pro-contra, contra-pro, and contra-contra chains according to
the order of polarity of the inference links in the chain from antecedents to
successors (see Figure 5).
Figure 5. Four types of direct chains: (a) pro-pro, (b) pro-contra, (c) contra-pro,
and (d) contra-contra chain
Among these, pro-contra and contra-pro are mixed chains. A chain
starting with a pro (contra) argument is called a pro (contra) chain. Corre-
spondingly, a bundle on b comprises all the inference links with antecedent
premises and their annotations that have b as their conclusion, and bundles
can be pro, contra, or mixed. Pro bundles may constitute convergent pro
arguments and contra bundles convergent contra arguments, but they do
not need to. If they are deemed not to have enough thematic unity, then
they might also be classified as multiple argumentation, which is laid out
in Section 3.6. Bundles with mixed polarity are always cases of multiple
argumentation.
Three more requirements are needed. The graphs also have to be fi-
nite, acyclic, and connected. In contrast to positional accounts like AAFs
and BAFs, which allow for cycles, acyclicity is needed in the present ap-
proach for a proper recursive assessment of argument strength. The addi-
tional requirements of connectedness and finiteness are trivial. They are
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finite, because human beings and machines can only consider finitely many
arguments at a time. Regarding connectedness, if there were several dis-
connected subgraphs, then we could evaluate argument strength in each of
them separately, since there is no global interaction between them in our
approach. Hence, connected graphs can be assumed without loss of gener-
ality.2
2.2. Remarks
The graphs introduced above capture the main types of argument struc-
ture that are commonly found in the literature. Linked and convergent argu-
ments have been discussed under various names, see Freeman (2011, Ch. 1)
for an overview. Conductive arguments go back to Wellman (1971, 1975).
Since then, some authors such as Hitchcock (1980, 1983) and contributions
to Blair (2011) accept them, whereas others like Adler (2013) reject them.
Entering this debate would go beyond the scope of this article.
A key assumption of the present approach to argument strength is that
it is possible to somehow intuitively assess the strength of arguments in isola-
tion first, and the goal is then to elaborate a theory of combinative argument
strength on the basis of this initial assessment and suitable rationality pos-
tulates. Cayrol & Lagasquie-Schiex (2005, 2009) and Selinger (2014) also
make this assumption, among others.
3. Combinative Argument Strength
In this section, I lay out and justify general principles for determining
the strength of complex arguments, i.e., principles for the computation of
argument strength in chains and convergent arguments on the basis of the
strength of their antecedents. In contrast to the initial assessment, I call this
aggregation of strength for larger structures combinative argument strength.
3.1. Basic Principles
Cayrol & Lagasquie-Schiex suggest three principles for BAFs that ar-
gument strength combination should obey, which they label P1–P3 (Cayrol
& Lagasquie-Schiex 2005: 78). They are quoted below, but with my own
naming scheme.
(DA) Direct Attack Principle
“The value of an argument depends on the values of its direct attackers
and of its direct supporters.” (Cayrol & Lagasquie-Schiex 2005: 78)
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(BQ) Bipolar Quality Principle
“If the quality of the support (resp. attack) increases then the value of
the argument increases (resp. decreases).” (ibid.)
(AP) Ampliativity
“If the quantity of the supports (resp. attacks) increases then the quality
of the support (resp. attack) increases.” (ibid.)
Of these principles the first two are obvious, as they directly reflect what
the words ‘support’ and ‘attack’ mean, for which the more neutral terms
‘pro’ and ‘contra’ are in my opinion preferable, as well as ‘argument strength’
instead of ‘value’ for reasons that will become more apparent in Section 3.7.
The principles are necessary, though not sufficient adequacy requirements
for a theory of argument strength in a bipolar setting. I disagree with Cayrol
& Lagasquie-Schiex, Selinger, and many others about ampliativity, though.
Such an approach might capture some psychological effects, but ampliative
argument strength cannot hold in general, because multiple premises for
the same conclusion are redundant in a purely deductive setting and can
lead to weaker conclusions when any kind of nonmonotonic inference pat-
tern, such as abduction or induction, is used. This issue will be addressed
again in Section 4. Since my aim is to find minimal requirements for an
acceptability-based theory of argument strength, I therefore suggest the fol-
lowing principle instead of AP:
(EN) Neutrality
The number of pro (contra) arguments in a bundle on a does not influ-
ence the argument strength of a.
Note that this principle holds for pro and contra bundles, but not neces-
sarily for mixed ones. For the latter it could make sense to stipulate a sepa-
rate principle that governs the way in which the strengths of pro and contra
arguments determine the overall strength of a standpoint, but the exclu-
sionary approach in Section 3.6 will not be mixed in that sense.
Principles DA, BQ, and EN are obviously not sufficient to determine
modes of argument strength combination. In the following paragraphs, I will
lay out more detailed principles and their justifications for the combination
of argument strength in linked arguments, chains, bundles, and convergent
arguments.
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3.2. The Strength of Convergent Arguments
The idea behind convergent arguments is that an arguer provides mul-
tiple supports of varying strength for or against some standpoint and that
this support has some thematic unity that makes it reasonable to consider
the whole discourse fragment as one argument, as opposed to thematically
more disconnected multiple argumentation. Here is an example of a conver-
gent argument for conclusion c with two basic arguments p1 and p2: “(c) It’s
going to rain tomorrow, (p1) [because] the weather forecast has predicted it
and (p2) I know these kind of clouds: They bring rain.”
Exclusionary Approach
The idea behind the following principle is that when several arguments
speak for a certain standpoint an arguer could, in theory, pick only the
strongest of them and discard all others, and because of the proposed in-
dependence of argument strength and polarity this also holds for contra
bundles.
(EP) Exclusionary Principle
The combined strength of a pro (contra) convergent argument is the
maximum of the strengths of its basic arguments.
So, it seems that in a theory with the Neutrality Principle this is the
only reasonable choice. But, as I laid out at the beginning of this section,
this is one of the most controversial issues, and only one of three different
theories of argument strength: In an ampliative theory, the bundle strength
is an increasing function of all pro (contra) links, in a nonampliative the-
ory the bundle strength may not be higher than the maximum strength of
pro (contra) links of the bundle, and in an exclusionary theory exactly the
maximum is chosen. All of these principles hinge on the assumption that
the inferences in a bundle are independent of each other with respect to the
inference type--deductive, inductive, abductive, and so forth--, since other-
wise specific rules of the inference type will govern their combination (see
Section 4).
Ampliative Approach
The general idea behind convergent arguments in an approach that
accepts AP is captured by the following principle:
(ACU) Cumulative Principle
The strength of convergent arguments consisting of n > 1 indepen-
dent basic arguments A1, . . . , An is increasing whenever n increases,
and larger than the maximum of the strengths of its parts Ai.
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Yanal uses f(x, y) = x + y − xy for two independent convergent argu-
ments with strengths x, y (Yanal, 1991, p. 140), which satisfies this principle.
If x, y > 0 then f(x, y) > x and f(x, y) > y, and moreover f(x, 0) = x and
f(0, y) = y. The function is also symmetric f(x, y) = f(y, x) and associative
f(f(x, y), z) = f(x, f(y, z)), so it can be used for a larger number of con-
verging arguments without introducing an undesirable order-dependence.
Selinger defends a variation g(x, y) = 2x + 2y − 2xy − 1 and requires
that x, y > 1
2
(Selinger, 2014, p. 386). For such inputs, the function sat-
isfies ACU. However, in Selinger’s approach a very bad additional argument
(e.g. y = 0.2) decreases the overall strength of the argument such that it
may fall below the threshold. For example, g(0.6, 0.2) = 0.36. From a psy-
chological point of view this might appear to be reasonable, but it seems
hard to justify from an ideally rational perspective that an acceptable ar-
gument (x > 1
2
) becomes unacceptable by merely mentioning it together
with another argument that is unacceptable. I thefore reject Selinger’s rule
in favor of Yanal’s.3
3.3. The Strength of Linked Arguments
The idea behind a linked argument is that all required premises need
to work together to support the conclusion. One criterion for determining
whether an argument is linked or not is whether a subset of the premises
could support an inference for or against the conclusion on their own. If
a subset can itself form an argument, then the argument as a whole is not
linked, but constitutes at least two convergent arguments. If, on the other
hand, no proper subset of the linked premises can for itself form a pro or
contra argument for the conclusion, but the totality of linked premises does
constitute an acceptable argument, then the argument is linked. This char-
acterization of linked arguments is rejected by Freeman (2011), cf. the dis-
cussion in Yanal (2002), and I do not claim that it is unproblematic. The
criterion only works for those premises that are required for the conclusion
to go through, but there might be reasons to allow additional premises that
form a thematic unity with the rest of the argument. For this reason, I re-
gard the criterion as a useful rule of thumb for cases when the required
premises can be identified easily rather than as a definite criterion. An-
other difference to convergent arguments is that in a linked argument one
missing premise will render the argument inconclusive or at least highly
contentious. Together these two rules of thumb suffice to distinguish linked
from convergent arguments.
As a typical example, in a deductive inference from (p ∧ q) → r, p,
q, to r, p and q are linked premises, in this case premises that are linked
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by logical conjunction, and no subset of {p, q, (p ∧ q) → r} alone serves as
a deductively valid argument for r. This in turn means that if one of the
premises is not sound, then the argument as a whole cannot be sound either.
Consequently, if we consider soundness in terms of degree of acceptability,
then the least strong premise must determine the strength of the argument
as a whole.4
Exclusionary Approach
The following principle makes the above considerations explicit:
(EML) Missing Linked Premise Principle
(a) The strength of a linked argument that misses one or more required
premises is below or at some lower threshold.
(b) The lower threshold cannot be higher than the strength of the weak-
est premise.
Linked arguments have a number a1, . . . , an of required premises, and for
some uses of bipolar argumentation graphs it may be desirable to annotate
the number of required arguments directly in the scheme. As we have seen
from the above deductive example, whenever one of the required premises
is missing, the strength of the whole argument is significantly weakened.
If the lower threshold is above zero, then the second part of the principle
is needed to ensure that leaving out a very weak required premise cannot
make the argument stronger, as this would be highly counter-intuitive in
combination with the next principle and is generally not reconcilable with
the idea that the premises are required.
Note that the lower threshold is not global, it is not independent of
the initial assessment, because it not only depends on the number of re-
quired premises, but also on their strengths in a given application of the
scheme. This complication can be avoided by setting the threshold to zero,
and this practice is consistent with the general ideas behind an exclusion-
ary account. Generally, presuming a zero lower threshold seems harder to
defend for an ampliative approach, though, and in both approaches only
makes sense if a distinction is made between premises that are left out, be-
cause they are known to be unsupported, and those that are left implicit
in enthymemes. In the first case, the missing premise can be treated just
like a required premise with minimal strength. In the second case, a zero
lower threshold can become highly counter-intuitive, since it is very com-
mon to leave out required premises in practice. However, it can be equally
counter-intuitive to allow a strength at or below a non-zero lower thresh-
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old for an enthymematic linked argument when the missing premise can be
trivially completed and is uncontroversial. Always taking missing required
premises of linked arguments as a reason to assign a strength at or below the
lower threshold is the least charitable assessment and therefore not adequate
in general.
A reasonable way to deal with this issue is to give up EML and only
consider subgraphs with all required premises. If the missing premise of
a linked argument is completed in this way, but assigned a very low strength,
then the following principle alone suffices for the exclusionary approach.5
(EWL) Weakest Link Principle
The strength of a linked argument is the minimum strength of its re-
quired premises.
This principle is well-known from possibility theory.6 In the present set-
ting, it follows directly from the definition of a linked argument given above.
The strength of a premise in a linked argument must be somehow connected
to its credibility with respect to its role in the linked argument, and the same
considerations as for chains apply. If the premise with the lowest credibil-
ity turns out false, then the strength of the overall argument falls down
to or below the lower threshold no matter how strong the other premises
are. Hence, the overall strength cannot exceed the minimum strength of the
premises in an exclusionary account in which there is no interplay between
argument quantity and quality.
Note that in the above example there must be a degree of support from p
to r, from q to r and from (p∧ q) → r to r. However, it is clear that none of
these assessments can be taken in isolation, as in a convergent argument, in
this case, but that they instead have to be taken with regard to the linked
argument as a whole, since otherwise the formal premise (p ∧ q) → r ought
not give any credence at all to r and the individual premises p and q alone
could also only boost r’s credence under some probabilistic or abductive
reinterpretation. So, for the purpose of determining combinative argument
strength, the premises of a linked argument cannot be regarded in isolation,
since otherwise we would end up with a trivial theory that simply assigns
strength 1 to any logically valid argument and 0 to any logically invalid
argument.
Ampliative Approach
How does a corresponding ampliative principle for linked argument
look? Such a principle will have to take into account thresholds in one form
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or another, too. The following principle is suitable, but not the only possible
candidate:
(ALT) Ampliative Linked Argument
The strength of a linked argument that has k premises and requires at
least n premises is equal to or above an upper threshold U ≥ 0.5 for
k ≥ n premises and equal to or below a lower threshold L < 0.5 for
k < n premises.
This suggests a range of k-ary threshold functions Skn(x1, . . . , xk) such
that for k ≥ n, Skn(x1, . . . , xk) ≥ U and for k < n, S
k
n(x1, . . . , xk) ≤ L close
to zero. The functions can be increasing with increasing k (k ≥ n) and de-
creasing with decreasing k (k < n). From this characterization it is clear that
ALT does not uniquely define a mode of combination, and further justifica-
tion is needed for any particular way in which the functions are supposed to
increase or decrease. In addition to ALT we could use an ampliative mode
of combination in accordance with ACU such as Yanal’s Rule whenever
k ≥ n. Alternatively, the functions may just yield the thresholds them-
selves. The simplest case is when U = 1, L = 0, and for a set of premises
{a1, . . . , an} and a conclusion b in a logical language L characterized by
inference relation ⊢L the function yields 1 if k = n, a1, . . . , ak ⊢L b and
{a1, . . . , ak} are L-consistent, 0 otherwise. However, this approach would
not be very useful, because it entirely disregards the initial assessment of
the strength of the premises with respect to the inference step x1, . . . xn.
Other than such negative constraints, it is difficult to find any convincing
arguments for characterizations of linked argument strength that are more
specific than ALT. The reason for this difficulty seems to be that the prob-
lem of ampliative argument strength combination is underdetermined (see
Section 4).
3.4. The Strength of Argument Chains
The four different types of chains between two arguments were listed in
Figure 5 of Section 2. In a bipolar setting in which there are pro and contra
arguments for a standpoint, the chains starting with a pro argument need
to be treated differently from the chains starting with a contra argument. In
an ampliative approach a pro antecedent will reinforce the strength of the
succedent argument. In contrast to this, a very strong contra argument at
the beginning of a chain will weaken the strength of the following argument.





The justification of the following principle mirrors that for EWL:
(EWP) Weakest Pro Principle
The strength of a pro-contra chain or a chain consisting of only pro
links is the minimum of all strengths of the links in the chain.
According to Dubois & Prade, this principle can be traced back to
Theophrastus and is a basic principle of possibilistic logic (Dubois & Prade
2009b: 2244). According to Selinger (2014), the Polish logician Tokarz (2006)
also defends it for models of argumentation.
In a chain of inferences in which each prior standpoint acts as a reason
(viz., justification in linguistic form) of the following standpoint or conclu-
sion, and in which all of them are either pro or contra, but not mixed,
each inference except for the first one depends on a previous inference, and
the weaker the previous inference is, the weaker will be the overall conclu-
sion, since each inference is a condition for the next inference to obtain.
So, the strength of the reasoning chain as a whole can also not be higher
than the strength of the weakest inference link. At the same time there
is no good reason to assume that the overall inference strength declines
independently of the strengths of the individual links.
Cayrol & Lagasquie-Schiex give the example of an evaluation with
negative argument strength for arguments with negative polarity (Cayrol
& Lagasquie-Schiex 2009: 79). In my view the phrase ‘negative strength’
makes no sense, though, and it is better to keep polarity and strength con-
ceptually apart. Therefore, the principle also holds for pro-contra chains
with a scheme as in Figure 5b, because contra arguments have positive
strength. However, as laid out above, the principle cannot hold for contra
chains. Take a mixed chain consisting of a contra argument from a to b with
initial strength x and a pro argument from b to c with initial strength y, for
example. In this scenario, if x is low, then y must be high, since the first
argument is against b; the overall strength of a chained argument should be
high in the absence of other pro and contra arguments if the only attack
of the pro argument is weak. The following general principles reflect these
considerations:
(EGP) General Attack/Support Principle
If S(x1, x2, . . . , xn) is the function for the combined strength of a mixed
chain x1, . . . , xn, then S is increasing in each pro argument xi and
decreasing in each contra argument xj .
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The principle makes explicit what is meant by ‘pro’ and ‘contra’. It is
a combination of principles DA and BQ. The procedure outlined in Sec-
tion 3.8 will take this principle into account. As it stands, EGP is far too
liberal, allowing all kinds of counter-intuitive increases and decreases of ar-
gument strength in a chain. Additional principles are needed in order to fix
appropriate upper and lower limits:
(EC+) Contra Chain Maximum
The combined strength of a contra argument C1 directly followed by
a pro (contra) argument C2 cannot be higher than the strength of C2.
Since a contra argument speaks against a standpoint, any chain of rea-
soning that is attacked by such an argument cannot become stronger than
it would be without an attack. However, an attack might have no strength
at all, and so the maximum strength of the chain under attack is the one
that it had if it had not been attacked at all, i.e., its initial assessment if no
other attackers or supporters are present. This holds for both pro and con-
tra arguments as the second part of the chain, since the strength of contra
arguments is also positive.
(EC–) Contra Chain Minimum
The combined strength of a contra argument C1 directly followed by
a pro (contra) argument C2 is minimal whenever the strength of C1 is
maximal.
Recall that the initial assessment is supposed to represent an evaluation
of the strength of arguments considered in isolation. Hence, an attack with
maximum strength completely defeats the argument it attacks and so the
resulting strength of the chain is minimal. This holds for both pro and con-
tra arguments as the second part of the chain, since the strength of contra
arguments is also positive. I therefore suggest that EGP, EC+ and EC–
are necessary principles for any viable account of the strength of argument
chains in a bipolar setting. As in the previous cases, they do not uniquely
determine a function for contra-chains, but in the absence of further criteria
EC+ and EC– strongly suggest S(x, y) = y − xy as a simple solution for
contra chains in Figure 5cd when a measure of strength is defined over the
unit interval [0, 1]. As the strength of the antecedent contra argument ap-
proaches 1, the strength of the successor argument should approach 0, and,
vice versa, as the strength of the antecedent contra argument approaches 0,
the strength of the successor argument should approach the level of its ini-
tial assessment. If another function is used, for instance one that introduces
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a nonlinearity, then additional criteria must be found to justify this more
complicated choice, for y − xy is the simplest non-trivial way of satisfying
EGP, EC+, and EC–.
Ampliative Approach
We can accept EGP, EC+ and EC– for the reasons laid out above, but
replace EWP by a more general principle:
(APC) Ampliative Pro Chain
The combined strength of a pro argument A directly followed by a pro
or contra argument B goes against the minimum as the strength of A
approaches the minimum, and against the strength of B as the strength
of A approaches the maximum.
Multiplicative combination of pro argument chains satisfies APC and
makes sense if each argument is independent of each other and if one
treats the dependencies between arguments in a pro chain as a conjunc-
tion. In possibility theory, both the minimum operation and multiplication
are t-norms and, thus, can be regarded as generalizations of logical conjunc-
tion,7 and multiplication is a natural choice for a t-norm in an ampliative
setting.
Which t-norm is chosen again seems to hinge on additional criteria and
it is difficult to find any decisive argument for one norm or another. Gen-
erally speaking, ampliative bipolar theories that allow for contra chains are
underdeveloped. Selinger’s approach is unipolar. Cayrol & Lagasquie-Schiex
give a general characterization (Cayrol & Lagasquie-Schiex 2009: 78/9), but
the two examples of evaluation functions they provide are not further mo-
tivated. Related work in possibility theory such as Dubois & Prade (2005)
looks promising, but does not translate directly to argumentation graphs.
That being said, EGP, EC+ and EC– are adequate for an ampliative ap-
proach to the strength of contra chains, too, for the same reasons as outlined
above, and so S(x, y) = y − xy also appears to be adequate for these types
of theories.
3.5. Link Attackers and Link Supporters
Let us now turn to link attackers and supporters. An example of link
support would be an argument like: “That conclusion isn’t just likely, ac-
cording to our current knowledge it follows almost with certainty.” Link
attacks are even more common, since any kind of doubt raised about the
inference pattern is a link attack. For example, the following are link at-
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tacks: “That’s a non-sequitur!”, “That’s a fallacy!”, and “I’m not sure. This
conclusion is maybe suggested by the data, but the sample size is fairly
small.”
Although there can be clear-cut cases if proponent and opponent agree
on a shared methodology, generally speaking, attacking and supporting in-
ference links are more problematic than the previous cases, because it is
not at all clear what an uncertain inference is and there are many rival
approaches to the modelling of uncertain inference.8 Since a link attack or
support must somehow decrease or increase the credibility of an inference
in an argument, it is a fortiori hard to justify particular modes of argument
strength combination for these types of indirect arguments. In the following
paragraphs I will discuss some principles that are intuitively plausible and
(partially) justifiable in the current bipolar setting.
Exclusionary Approach
Although this is ultimately unsatisfactory, I suggest treating link attack
and support like argument chains in an exclusionary approach. The reason
why this is unsatisfactory is that there are strong intuitions towards taking
link attackers and supporters as diminishing and augmenting the strength
of an argument, which suggests ampliative principles. If ampliativity is flat-
out rejected in a strict exclusionary approach, then all we are left with is
the following principle:
(ELS) Link Support Principle
The strength of an argument with a link supporter with initial
strength x for a link between A and b with strength y is the minimum
of x and y.
Similarly to EWP, the idea behind this principle is that an argument
can only have its full strength if its inference step is fully supported. So if
link support is regarded in isolation to the rest of the argument, and if the
strength of the argument is y without considering link support, then it can
remain y only if the link is supported with its maximum value, i.e., when
x = 1 in an approach with argument strength in [0, 1]. Moreover, from the
limited exclusionary point of view, an argument can never be stronger than
the strength of its inference step or the strength of its premises taken in
isolation. Unsound premises do not become ‘more sound’ by arguing for the
acceptability of the inference step, and an already unacceptable inference
step does not become acceptable by making the premises stronger. Take for
instance any classical logical fallacy. If the inference is invalid to start with,
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then increasing the soundness of one or more premises will not make the ar-
gument stronger overall, because the inference to the conclusion will remain
just as invalid as before. Hence, under the exclusionary understanding of
link support, the inference cannot be stronger than this support and, there-
fore, the argument as a whole can also not be stronger than that support.
This justifies ELS, though only under the given exclusionary interpreta-
tion which can be counter-intuitive to people who naturally lean towards
ampliative principles.
Similar considerations lead to the following principle for link attacks:
(ELA) Link Attack Principle
The strength of an argument with link attacker with initial strength x
for a link between A and b with strength y is going against y as x goes
against the minimum, and against the minimum as x goes against the
maximum.
This is a variant of EC+ and EC– for link attackers and the justification
is analogous to the above one for link support. If an attack on an inference
step is completely pointless, i.e. has minimum strength, then the attacked
argument ought not be diminished in strength at all. If, on the other hand,
an attack on an inference step is maximally strong, then this means that
the inference step is wholly unacceptable, and an argument based on an
unacceptable inference cannot be acceptable, no matter how appealing the
premises may be.
Ampliative Approach
Note that there are two possible interpretations of link attackers and
supporters in the current setting in which a prior strength is associated with
arguments. First, attackers and supporters may be taken akin to argument
chains, except that they pertain to the inference rather than premises. Sec-
ond, they could be understood as providing additional support or casting
additional doubt on the strength of the inference. In the first case, all con-
siderations of Section 3.4 apply, so the strength of an argument with prior
strength and link support should be xy and the strength with a link attack
should be y − xy, as in chains. Generally speaking, link attackers and sup-
porters impose additional conditions on overall argument strength in this
view, which constitutes an ampliative counterpart to ELS. In the second
case, additional support is modelled on the basis of ACU as in Section 3.2,
using Yanal’s ampliative combination x+ y− xy, whereas attacks work the
same as in the first case.
48
Towards a Model of Argument Strength for Bipolar Argumentation Graphs
3.6. Mixed Bundles and Multiple Argumentation
To recall, as a ‘mixed bundle’ we have characterized a number of com-
peting pro and contra arguments for and against some standpoint, whereas
multiple argumentation is a case of either multiple pro or multiple contra
arguments against a standpoint, but not both pro and contra arguments.
How to deal with such cases? I’d like to suggest principles similar to those
that govern the combination of argument strength within linked and con-
vergent arguments, but as I will lay out below, they need not necessarily be
the same.
Exclusionary Approach
One may call a theory that endorses the following principle noncom-
pensatory:
(EMB) Maximum Bundle Principle
The strongest pro or contra argument uniquely determines the strength
of a mixed bundle and multiple arguments in case of multiple argumen-
tation; other arguments have no effect.
This property is radical but has been defended in the literature on Prac-
tical Reasoning by authors like Horty, who reject the weighing conception of
practical reasons (Horty 2012: 3–5). From this perspective, either a pro or
contra argument is decisive or it is not. If it is decisive, then other arguments
with the same polarity are redundant, and parallel counter-arguments are
regarded as defeated or outranked. If it is not decisive, then either another
argument in the mixed bundle is decisive or the argument as a whole is in-
conclusive. Horty allows for the latter possibility (Horty 2012: 47–53), and
the next principle also endorses it.
(ERC) Reason Conflict Principle
In a bundle a in which the strongest pro argument is as strong as the
strongest contra argument, the strength of a is at the minimum.
If the strongest pro and contra arguments are equally acceptable, then
the bundle as a whole cannot be acceptable. From an exclusionary point of
view, such an argument is not conclusive, so no conclusion should be drawn
from it.
Ampliative Approach
To satisfy ampliativity, convergent bundles a1, . . . , an of polarity p on b
should yield an overall p-argument with a strength that is larger than the
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maximum strength Max(xi) of the strengths x1, . . . , xn of the links from
ai to b, which suggests using the same function as discussed in Section 3.2.9
(ABP) Ampliative Bundle Principle
Bundles of the same polarity are treated like complex convergent argu-
ments.
The theory may additionally be compensatory, which is reflected by the
following principle:
(ACO) Compensatory Bundle Principle
The total strength of all pro bundles on C is weighed against the total
strength of all contra bundles on C by a function that (i) is increasing
in its first argument for the pro bundle and (ii) decreasing in its second
argument for the contra bundle.
Łukasiewicz’s t-normMax(0, x+y−1) adjusted for negative polarity as
S(x, y) = Max(0, x − y) fulfills this requirement and represents a sceptical
weighing conception. A less cautious weighing conception is given, as in the
above mode, for contra chains as S′(x, y) = x − xy. On the other hand,
f(x, y) = −xy+1 is not acceptable, since f(a, 0) = 1 even if a is close to zero.
Of course, an account can also be ampliative without being compensatory;
in that case, the strength of a convergent argument with a given polarity
satisfies ampliativity while at the same time EMB and maybe also ERC are
accepted for the mixed case.
As for choosing a particular function, as in the previous examples, ad-
ditional justifications would have to be given, but at the time of this writing
no decisive arguments for a set of criteria that yields a unique solution to
the problem are available. The problem of ampliative argument strength for
bundles appears to be underdetermined.
3.7. Conductive Arguments
Conductive arguments combine several premises that mutually reinforce
each other, but, in contrast to linked arguments, they are not substantially
weakened when one of the premises is taken away. According to Govier,
conductive arguments are a subspecies of convergent arguments, but they
also allow for counter considerations (Govier 2013: 353; 355–366). They
allow for mixed cases in our terminology, too, but, as a terminological choice,
I do not classify them as convergent in order to distinguish the two types in
the framework more easily; it would, of course, also be possible to introduce
different types of convergent arguments instead.
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The following statement is a typical example of a conductive argument:
“London is a great place to live despite high rents and high transporta-
tion costs; there are so many attractions, beautiful buildings, museums and
things to do, and the city is bursting with life.” It consists of several pro and
some additional contra considerations, and the overall conclusion is that the
pro considerations outweigh the contra considerations, which is the reason
why these arguments are also sometimes called ‘balance of consideration
arguments’ (Govier 2013: 353). It is striking that in the city example vari-
ous criteria are combined in some way to support a conclusion, that these
types of arguments seem to play a crucial role in practical and evaluative
reasoning, and that there is therefore a close relation of these arguments to
research in multi-criteria decision making like Fishburn (1970) and Keeney
& Raiffa (1976).
Exclusionary Approach
Since conductive arguments are based on some way of weighing pro
against contra considerations, the exclusionary account reaches its limits
with them. They are ampliative by definition. If one had to force an exclu-
sionary evaluation of strength for them, it would have to be the same as
for a convergent argument that beats another convergent argument of the
opposite polarity. However, this approach seems too coarse-grained to be of
any practical relevance.
Ampliative Approach
On the one hand, an ampliative approach to conductive arguments must
differ from linked arguments, as their strength does not fall down to a thresh-
old when a premise is taken away as in the case of a linked argument. In
contrast to mixed bundles, on the other hand, subarguments or premises of
the same polarity do not first have to be combined, before weighing them
against all arguments of the opposite polarity, or at least some additional
justification would be needed to justify this particular mode of aggrega-
tion. The following principle reflects these characteristics, where premises
are taken to be ordered into two groups according to their polarity:
(ACA) Ampliative Conductive Argument
In a conductive argument the strengths of the pro premises x1, . . . , xk
is weighed against the strengths of the contra premises xk+1, . . . , xn by
a function F (x1, . . . , xk;xk+1, . . . , xn) that is increasing in x1, . . . , xk
and decreasing in xk+1, . . . , xn. If p is pro (contra), then F approaches
its maximum as x1, . . . , xk approach their maximum (minimum) val-
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ues and xk+1, . . . , xn approach their minimum (maximum) values, and
F approaches its minimum as x1, . . . , xk approach their minimum (max-
imum) values and xk+1, . . . , xn approach their maximum (minimum)
values.
Let wi = 1 if pi = ⊕, wi = −1 otherwise. Then the normalized sum
fulfills ACA:






However, there is a huge problem with this way of thinking about conduc-
tive arguments that needs to be mentioned, even though I cannot go into
the details here. It is, in my view, incorrect to mix up argument strength
with the evaluative contribution of reasons, since (i) an argument for and
support for a certain level of a cardinal or ordinal value attribute such
as ‘quality of life’ or ‘costs’ can be more or less strong, (ii) there may be
different types of value or criteria both formally (e.g. additive vs. lexico-
graphic) and substantially (e.g. different qualities of value in value plural-
ism), but there is only one degree of argument strength, (iii) it is known
from multi-attribute decision making that numerical representations of mul-
tiple criteria that are ordered by preferences must satisfy corresponding
representation theorems.10 Consequently, the normalized sum can only be
used to represent argument strength in conductive arguments without fur-
ther ado, and it seems that many types of conductive arguments need to
additionally take into account explicit representations of the evaluative com-
ponent, which must satisfy corresponding representation theorems in order
to make the argument acceptable—if a representation theorem is violated,
the argument strength as a whole needs to fall to a lower threshold as in
a linked argument. More work is needed to elaborate the distinction be-
tween argument strength and evaluative components of conductive argu-
ments.11
3.8. Recursive Valuation Procedure
In this section, an example will illustrate the combination of the princi-
ples discussed so far. I will not give a strict definition of how to go through
a BAG to assign particular values, as it is easier to illustrate this procedure
by example. The principal idea is very straightforward: In the absence of
cycles, we have to traverse the graph from its initial nodes to the termi-
nal nodes, determine the structure of the (sub-)arguments in question, and
choose a particular mode of argument strength combination that satisfies
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the principles discussed in the previous sections. As I have laid out above, in
some cases exactly one function is at least strongly suggested. Most of the
time, however, the concrete functions that were given are only candidates
that in the absence of further constraints are plausible.
Exclusionary Approach
Evaluation starts at the initial leaves of the BAG. These are the premises
of one of the above argument types, and an initial valuation is associ-
ated either with each premise or with the links. To each conclusion b,
one of the above modes of combination is applied in order as follows:
(1) The strength of a linked argument is the minimum strength of the
strength of its premises. (2) The strength of a basic argument is its ini-
tial strength. (3) The strength of a convergent argument consisting of basic
or linked antecedents A1, A2, . . . , An is the maximum of the strengths of
A1, A2, . . . , An. (4) The strength y of one of (1)–(3) plus a link supporter
with strength x isMin(x, y). (5) The strength y of one of (1)–(4) plus a link
attack with strength x is y−xy. (6) If the argument(s) for or against b form
the first part of a chain to c, then the strength of the chain to c is calculated
as described in Section 3.2 by nesting of two-argument rules in the direction
of argument flow. (7) The strength of a mixed bundle is calculated as out-
lined above. (8) The strength of a larger graph is calculated by repeatedly
applying steps (1)–(7) in the direction of argument flow until all terminal
nodes have been reached. The end result of the antecedent to the terminal
node is the strength of the conclusion at that node.
Example valuation:
Figure 6 depicts a bipolar argument graph and the steps needed for its
recursive evaluation: α. Convergent pro argument S(α) = 0.9; β. Linked
contra argument S(β) = Min(0.5, 0.7) = 0.5; γ. link attack on β with
S(γ) = Min(0.7, 0.5); δ. mixed bundle on d where α beats γ and so S(δ) =
S(α) = 0.9; ǫ. pro-pro chain on e with S(ǫ) = Min(0.9, 0.8) = 0.8, which
is the final strength of e. Suppose instead that α was a convergent contra
argument against d. Then it would still beat γ, but the final result would
be S(ǫ) = 0.8 − 0.9 × 0.8 = 0.08, i.e., the conclusion e would have almost
no argumentative support.
Ampliative Approach
This is like the exclusionary approach, except that corresponding am-





α. S(a1, a2) = 0.9 + 0.7 − 0.9 × 0.7 = 0.97 = x and S(α) = S(x, a3) =
0.979 by Yanal’s Rule. For the linked argument, assuming that all required
premises are present and Yanal’s Rule can be used, S(β) = 0.5+0.7−0.5×
0.7 = 0.85. S(γ) = 0.85 − 0.7× 0.85 = 0.255 according to S(x, y) = y − xy.
Assuming ABP, ACO, and Yanal’s Rule again, S(δ) = 0.979 − 0.979 ×
0.255 = 0.729355. Finally, S(ǫ) = 0.729355×0.8 = 0.583484. Notice that we
still have to decide in the last step, whether the pro bundle beats the contra
bundle in order to determine whether the chain is a pro-pro or contra-pro
chain. Suppose, as in the previous example, that α was a convergent contra
argument against d. We would then get an ampliative contra-bundle with
S(δ) = 0.85 + 0.255 − 0.85 × 0.255 = 0.88825 and a final contra-pro chain
with S(ǫ) = 0.8 − 0.88825 × 0.8 = 0.0894, i.e., almost the same result as
in the previous case.
Figure 6. Example of a Bipolar Argumentation Graph with 5 evaluation steps α−ǫ.
The argument in the graph starts with a convergent pro argument α and
a linked contra argument β that is in turn attacked by a link attack γ.
The pro and contra arguments together form a mixed bundle argument δ
for standpoint d, which in turn forms the premise of a pro argument ǫ for
standpoint e. Opponent and proponent roles are not assigned in this type
of model.
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4. Critical Discussion
We have seen exclusionary and ampliative rationality principles for the
combination of argument strength, and in each case I have briefly justified
why these are adequate for the combination of intuitive prior assessments of
argument strength. However, a number of problems have become apparent
from the previous sections that I would like to address in the remainder of
this article.
4.1. Problem Underdetermination
A problem formulation can be overdetermined or underdetermined. If it
is overdetermined, then the problem might not have a solution. If it is under-
determined, then there might be too many solutions or it might not even be
possible to identify a reasonable range of solutions. As the discussion so far
has shown, the problem of finding an intuitively compelling notion of com-
binative argument strength is underdetermined. Reasonable principles for
ampliative and exclusionary argument strength do not determine functions
for strength combination uniquely. Instead, the range of admissible functions
is infinite and the suggested modes of combination were chosen on the basis
of simplicity. To obtain specific solutions, for example a set of necessary and
sufficient axioms, additional principles would be needed. Where could these
come from? It seems to me that additional principles would need to come
from the rules that govern the particular type of argument–whether it is
deductive, inductive, or abductive.
To illustrate this point, let us take another look at the independence re-
quirements for the premises of linked and convergent arguments. Suppose we
have two seemingly convergent applications of modus ponens in deductive
reasoning such that {a, a → c} forms one basic argument and {b, a → c}
another basic argument for conclusion c. If in this example additionally
a → b held, then the second argument would be redundant, hence rules like
EP and ACU would not be applicable. These principles can only apply if
the two premises are logically independent of each other, or, as a heuristic, if
their logical relation to each other is not known. If, contrary to that, a → b is
known, then a rational assessment of b’s stength cannot intuitively be higher
than that of a. It is evident that in a probabilistic framework a corresponding
independence condition would be P (A|B) = P (A) or some more complex
condition in a more elaborate probabilistic setting such as Jøsang (2008),
and yet another formulation of independence will be needed for a particular
account of abduction. The idea behind rules like EP is that the arguments
cannot be spelt out in all detail with precise numbers available, but that
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it still makes sense to assume or presume that the premises are sufficiently
independent of each other. But this is an assumption, and if more is known
about the type of argument at play and whether the corresponding inde-
pendence condition is fulfilled or not, then rules laid out in the previous
section will yield incorrect results. They are underdetermined in order to
allow the intuitive assessment of the strength of arguments of very differ-
ent types without going into the details, and in that respect only serve as
heuristics.
There is a more fundamental problem with conductive arguments. As
laid out above, balance of consideration type arguments are based on evalu-
ations which have multiple aspects or dimensions. These can be more or less
acceptable, hence the strength of considerations for or against a standpoint
may vary independently of the evaluative component ‘value vs. disvalue
of a certain kind’. The strengths of the considerations is what (loosely)
corresponds to the weighting of different criteria in multi-criteria decision
making, but from the point of view of argumentation theory the standard
model of decision making makes too many assumptions. A strong consid-
eration for or against some standpoint in a conductive argument may also
lexicographically outrank other considerations, for instance, and there are
many different ways to combine multiple criteria qualitatively or quantita-
tively. Argument strength for conductive arguments is intertwined with the
problem of determining multiple criteria, aspects of betterness, or value di-
mensions and how to rationally aggregate them into overall assessments. So,
the problem of combinative argument strength for conductive arguments is
additionally underdetermined, because the notion of conductive argument
is itself unclear and problematic. If individual aspects of values in such
arguments could generally be represented by utilities and strength could
be represented by weights and probability measures, then expected utility
in multi-attribute utility theory could be used to combine them into an
overall assessment of a certain ‘strength’. However, this approach is inade-
quate for qualitative (ordinal) value aggregation and not general enough to
deal with all types of conductive arguments. Unless this problem is solved,
conductive arguments and their relation to non-traditional and traditional
multi-attribute decision making remain unclear and consequently the role
of (sub-)argument strengths (aka weights in decision making) in balance of
consideration arguments will remain unclear.
4.2. Overdetermination
There is another problem. The rules discussed in the previous sections
sometimes also overdetermine combinative argument strength, because they
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sometimes give the wrong result. This is easiest to see with ampliativ-
ity (AP). Of course, ampliativity cannot be literally a property of every ar-
gument. Consider any convergent pro argument or multiple pro arguments
for the same standpoint. If the arguments are deductive, then additional
premises may either be redundant or they might contradict each other, in
case of which the argument may become trivial.12 As laid out above, amplia-
tivity can only hold for logically independent premises. But things are even
worse for abductive and probabilistic reasoning patterns, as these are non-
monotonic and this property means that additional premises that seem to
count in favour of the conclusion can actually make the conclusion less cred-
ible. So AP cannot hold in general, even though it may serve as a useful
heuristic in many cases.
By the same token, it is also possible to construct counter-examples
to corresponding exclusionary principles. For example, if a convergent ar-
gument is, in the end, upon closer scrutiny probabilistic, then additional
evidence that is spelt out in the form of additional premises may indeed
raise the level of support for the conclusion. In abduction this is even the
canonical case: Additional indicators often strengthen the degree of plausi-
bility of the most plausible conclusion in comparison to other conclusions.
So, principle EP is not only information lossy, it may under certain circum-
stances defeat the whole purpose of arguing in a certain way.
At the same time, the fact that such principles appear to be intuitively
plausible indicates that they may serve as useful heuristics and constitute
some weak form of ‘ecological rationality’. In other words, they are not
irrational, but they do not constitute strict rationality principles in the
sense of being generally truth-conducive.
4.3. The Connection to Epistemology
I would like to suggest that the problems characterized in the previous
paragraphs are based on a deeper issue. Aside from further dialectic criteria,
argument strength primarily pertains to the ‘quality’ of the premises and
inference step, but (i) the quality of the premises hinges on the available
evidence and thus, ultimately, on the state of nature or on mathematical
laws, and (ii) the quality of the inference step hinges on the type of inference
and maybe some considerations about how likely it is that the inference was
correct or successful in practice. Because of the second dependence, a fully
justified theory of argument strength would need to use different principles
for different types of inference, such as deduction, induction, abduction,
and value-based conductive arguments in practical reasoning. It is clear,
for instance, that from an ideally rational perspective a deductive inference
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can only be fully acceptable when it is logically valid and in practice an
assessment of the probability that an error has been made would be needed
in order to get a justified ‘degree of strength’ for such an inference. Likewise,
inductive inferences must meet the correctness criteria of proper inferential
statistics and it has been mentioned above that at least some types of value
representations in some conductive arguments have to satisfy representation
theorems of multi-criteria decision making. All of these differences lead to
different criteria, and so it seems that no uniform theory is possible.
Because of the first dependence, rational theories of argument strength
are split into two branches. An agent-relative theory assesses the quality
of premises on the basis of an agent’s epistemic state. However, it may be
argued convincingly that such a theory would not be a theory of argument
strength in the general sense, since the strength of an argument can hardly
vary from person to person; it would be a theory of perceived argument
strength, and then one may ask why such a theory ought not be a purely
psychological theory of how convincing humans find arguments. In contrast
to this, an agent-agnostic theory evaluates the quality of premises on the ba-
sis of the state of nature in addition to logical and mathematical principles.
But this is nothing other than what is studied in the philosophy of science
and parts of epistemology! Although, perhaps, ideally rationally justifiable,
such a theory does not capture an intuitive notion of argument strength, but
rather lays out a general epistemological framework. There are also reason-
able doubts whether such a theory is feasible in general, since there are many
different methods of inquiry and theory formation and there does not seem
to be any ‘logic of scientific discovery’. Be that as it may, a fully comprehen-
sive theory that links arguments to evidence and methods of inquiry would
have to make far too many and too strong ideal rationality requirements to
be useful as a theory of argument strength in argumentative practice. That
is the conundrum faced by any theory of argument strength.
5. Conclusion
Basic principles for the combination of argument strength in complex
arguments in a bipolar setting have been laid out and partially justified.
I have then argued that these cannot serve as general rationality postulates,
despite their intuitive appeal, and instead should rather be regarded as
reflecting heuristics that may sometimes be useful and sometimes might fail.
However, this observation does not preclude more specific approaches
to argument strength that are obtained by taking into account more specific
58
Towards a Model of Argument Strength for Bipolar Argumentation Graphs
inference patterns, theories of uncertain inference, and notions of support
by premises. For example, the above principles can be refined in terms of
possibility theory, probability theory, or Dempster-Shafer theory. My main
complaint about such approaches is one of practicality. The more precise
these theories are made, the more the endeavour as a whole becomes one of
laying out a general epistemological framework, a generic method of inquiry
as some Bayesians have attempted, and the less practical it therefore be-
comes as a general theory of argument strength. I believe that an exclusion-
ary theory like the one presented in this article may serve as a reasonable
and cautious middle ground between a purely psychological account and
a theoretically sound epistemology that, nevertheless, remains of merely
theoretical interest, because in practice data is often too sparse and too
imprecise to elaborate all the details of an argument.
N O T E S
1 See Hitchcock (2015), cf. Yanal (2002, 20–3) and Freeman (2011, Ch. 5). To make
things worse, as Hitchcock sets out, Govier’s notion of conductive arguments seems to over-
lap with ways in which convergent arguments have been understood, and neither of these
distinctions matches the pragma-dialectic distinction between coordinatively compound
and multiple arguments (Hitchcock, 2015, 4–6). See also Snoeck Henkemans (2000) who
gives an overview of similar, though not identical distinctions made in Pragma-Dialectic
Argumentation Theory.
2 Selinger (2014) makes the same requirements. Besnard & Hunter (2008) make the
assumption that argument graphs must be trees, which is stronger than what is needed
here.
3 Following a suggestion by an anonymous reviewer, it is worth mentioning in this
context that a bad argument for C does not generally make a good argument for not C.
By comparison, in probability calculus P (notA) = 1 − P (A). Such a principle would be
inadequate for argument strength.
4 These considerations are only acceptable under a material reading of the inference
according to which p and q contribute positive reasons for r in light of the major premise,
because they are acceptable as true. There is also a formal reading according to which
the logical support of the premises is maximal if p and q are false and (p ∧ q) → r
is considered fully acceptable. The difference is between logical and epistemic support,
and strictly speaking we ought not use the truth-functional conditional ‘→’ for a reading
that excludes the second case. However, there is no need to enter this well-known debate
on natural language vs. logical conditionals here; the example is simplified for illustration.
5 This practice is admissible, since a linked argument can only be recognized as such
if missing premises are identified. The same does not hold for other types of arguments,
except basic arguments with just one premise. In fact, it is not even clear what would
make a conductive or a convergent argument enthymematic in the first place.
6 See for instance Dubois (2009b).
7 See Haehnle (2001, 301); cf. Dubois & Prade (1988, 2004) for introductions.
8 See Kyburg & Teng (2001).
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9 A theory that does not satisfy this criterion is nonampliative. For example, averaging
the strengths is nonampliative.
10 Point (iii) follows from results in measurement theory such as Debreu (1954), Krantz
et al (1971), Roberts (1979), whereas theories without numerical representations have
to find reasonable ways of evading variants of Arrow’s Theorem like those discussed in
Bouyssou & Pirlot (2003). Point (i) is similar to the combination of quantified risk with
utility in Multi-attribute Utility Theory: Risk enters evaluation by a principle such as
the Expected Utility Hypothesis, for instance, but it is not the same as the evaluative
component, and a similar relationship must hold for argument strength and an evaluative
component.
11 There are reasons for being sceptical that the above structures for conductive argu-
ments can faithfully represent value- and criteria-based reasoning, as they cannot easily
be used to represent the essentially comparative nature of that reasoning. For example, in
practical reasoning, meaningful comparisons between different attributes are only possible
when the maximum and minimum levels of those attributes are known to the decision
maker (Eisenfuehr et al. 2010: 151–154). This topic is left for another occasion.
12 Whether ex falso quod libet constitutes a problem or not depends on many factors and
I wish to avoid this discussion. What counts here is the AP will no longer hold, or is at
least very hard to justify for those cases.
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